东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2010, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (1): 141-144.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于垂直产品差异的垄断厂商广告投入分析

袁文榜;赵新良;陈忠全;   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院;
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-20 修回日期:2013-06-20 出版日期:2010-01-15 发布日期:2013-06-20
  • 通讯作者: -
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772097)

Monopoly firm's advertising investment analysis based on vertical differentiation

Yuan, Wen-Bang (1); Zhao, Xin-Liang (1); Chen, Zhong-Quan (1)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-20 Revised:2013-06-20 Online:2010-01-15 Published:2013-06-20
  • Contact: Yuan, W.-B.
  • About author:-
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摘要： 为了揭示具有不同商誉厂商的广告投入模式,根据消费者特征假设,在垂直产品差异框架内构建不同广告强度下的厂商利润函数,利用逆向归纳法,分析不同质量预期系数情形下的广告投入模式.分析结果表明,如果广告质量预期系数太小,企业选择不进行广告投资;如果这一系数很大,企业选择高强度广告投资;而如果这一系数处于中间状态,则选择高强度与低强度广告投资无差异.质量预期系数与厂商商誉紧密相连,在一定程度上可以理解为厂商信誉.商誉越高的厂商为了维护其既有的商誉,愿意提供更高质量的商品,这进一步强化了高强度广告传递高质量信号的结论.

关键词: 垂直产品差异, 广告强度, 企业商誉, 产品质量, 垄断

Abstract: A profit function of different ad intensity was derived within the framework of vertical product differentiation in accordance to the assumption of consumer's characteristic to reveal the ad models of firms with different goodwill. The ad models with different quality expectation coefficient were analyzed by the method of backward induction. The results showed that if the quality expectation coefficient is too small, the firms will choose not to pay the advertising, and if the coefficient is large enough, the high ad intensity will be the firms' choice, and if the coefficient is in the middle position, it's no difference for the firm to invest in high ad intensity and low ad intensity. The quality expectation coefficient relates so closely to the goodwill of firm that it can be regarded as the goodwill itself to a certain extent. A monopoly firm with better goodwill will provide high quality product to maintain its existing goodwill, which confirms further the conclusion that high-intensity ad signal high-quality.

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