互助担保:连带责任、互助保证金与成员努力程度

doi:10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2018.03.029

东北大学学报:自然科学版 ›› 2018, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (3): 451-456.DOI: 10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2018.03.029

• 管理科学 • 上一篇

互助担保:连带责任、互助保证金与成员努力程度

程春雨，钟田丽

(东北大学工商管理学院，辽宁沈阳110169)

收稿日期:2016-09-28 修回日期:2016-09-28 出版日期:2018-03-15 发布日期:2018-03-09
通讯作者: 程春雨
作者简介:冯明杰(1971-)，男，河南禹州人，东北大学副教授; 王恩刚(1962-)，男，辽宁沈阳人，东北大学教授，博士生导师.程春雨(1987-)，男，河南周口人，东北大学博士研究生；钟田丽(1956-)，女，辽宁大连人，东北大学教授，博士生导师.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(51171041).辽宁省财政科研基金重点资助项目(14B009).

Mutual Guarantee: Joint Liability， Mutual Margin and Peer Effort

CHENG Chun-yu， ZHONG Tian-li

School of Business Administration， Northeastern University， Shenyang 110169， China.

Received:2016-09-28 Revised:2016-09-28 Online:2018-03-15 Published:2018-03-09
Contact: CHENG Chun-yu
About author:-
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摘要/Abstract

摘要： 构建了针对现行互助担保模式的简单模型，分析了在互助担保中连带责任以及互助保证金对成员企业努力程度的影响.为了进一步激励成员企业的努力程度，提出增加监督惩罚机制和次序担保贷款机制，并通过建立动态激励模型验证了这些机制的有效性.研究结果如下:在现行的互助担保机制下，连带责任越大成员企业努力程度越低，且保证金越多成员企业努力程度越低，而引入监督惩罚机制以及次序贷款机制能够一定程度避免成员企业低努力程度行为的发生.

关键词: 互助担保, 连带责任, 互助保证金, 成员努力程度, 道德风险, 次序贷款

Abstract: A basic model was designed for the current mutual guarantee mode， which analyzed the effect of joint liability and mutual margin on the effort level of member enterprises. In order to encourage the efforts of member enterprises， it was proposed to strengthen the supervision and punishment mechanism and the sequential lending mechanism， and the effectiveness of these mechanisms was verified by establishing a dynamic incentive model. The results showed that under the existing mutual guarantee mechanism， the greater the joint liability and margin are， the lower the effort of the member enterprises will be. The supervision and punishment mechanism and the sequential lending mechanism can prevent member enterprises from taking low effort actions.

Key words: mutual guarantee, joint liability, mutual margin, peer effort, moral risk, sequential lending

中图分类号:

程春雨，钟田丽. 互助担保:连带责任、互助保证金与成员努力程度[J]. 东北大学学报:自然科学版, 2018, 39(3): 451-456.

CHENG Chun-yu， ZHONG Tian-li. Mutual Guarantee: Joint Liability， Mutual Margin and Peer Effort[J]. Journal of Northeastern University Natural Science, 2018, 39(3): 451-456.

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互助担保:连带责任、互助保证金与成员努力程度

Mutual Guarantee: Joint Liability， Mutual Margin and Peer Effort

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