东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报（自然科学版） ›› 2013, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 1665-1668.DOI: 10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2013.11.034

• 管理科学 • 上一篇    下一篇

动态不一致性对最优长期契约的影响

陆阳，庄新田   

  1. (东北大学工商管理学院，辽宁沈阳110819)
  • 发布日期:2013-07-09
  • 通讯作者: 陆阳
  • 作者简介:陆阳(1978-)，男，辽宁沈阳人，东北大学讲师，博士;庄新田(1956-)，男，吉林四平人，东北大学教授，博士生导师.
  • 基金资助:
    中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N120306001).

Impact of Dynamic Inconsistency on Optimal LongTerm Contracts

LU Yang， ZHUANG Xintian   

  1. School of Business Administration， Northeastern University， Shenyang 110819， China.
  • Published:2013-07-09
  • Contact: LU Yang
  • About author:-
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摘要： 针对长期契约中的重复道德风险问题，在考虑了代理人时间偏好的基础上建立三阶段的激励模型，探索动态不一致性对长期契约的影响.结果表明:动态不一致性不改变长期契约的记忆性，即代理人当前的高产出将对后续阶段其自身报酬产生积极的影响；动态不一致性改变了长期契约各阶段之间的鞅性质，第一阶段的最优效用小于第二、第三阶段效用的期望值.

关键词: 动态不一致性, 长期契约, 重复道德风险, 委托代理问题, 鞅

Abstract: With the repeated moral hazard of longterm contracts aimed at and the agent of time preference taken into account， a threeperiod incentive model was developed and the impact of dynamic inconsistency on longterm contracts was then explored. The results showed that dynamic inconsistency does not change the memorability of longterm contracts， i. e. the high output at the current stage will positively affect the agent's payoff in the later periods; dynamic inconsistency does change the martingales of different periods， and the agent's optimal utility in Period 1 is less than the expected value in Period 2 and Period 3.

Key words: dynamic inconsistency, longterm contract, repeated moral hazard, principalagent issue, martingale

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