东北大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2014, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (2): 135-140.DOI: -

• 科技哲学研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

知识论中信念度的概率确证贝叶斯知识论

郑辉军,曹剑波   

  1. (厦门大学人文学院,福建厦门361005)
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-28 修回日期:2013-06-28 出版日期:2014-03-25 发布日期:2014-04-17
  • 通讯作者: 郑辉军等
  • 作者简介:郑辉军(1979-),男,江西铅山人,厦门大学博士研究生,主要从事当代知识论、心灵哲学研究;曹剑波(1970-),男,湖南南县人,厦门大学教授,博士生导师,主要从事当代英美知识论、女性主义、宗教哲学研究。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金青年资助项目(13CZX052)。

Probabilistic Justification of Degrees of Belief in EpistemologyBayesian Epistemology

ZHENG Huijun, CAO Jianbo   

  1. (School of Humanities, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China)
  • Received:2013-06-28 Revised:2013-06-28 Online:2014-03-25 Published:2014-04-17
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摘要: 自葛梯尔问题提出以来,当代知识论的论证基本集中在确证这一要素之上,但就确证而言,无论是其结构还是其功能都饱受争议,至今仍未有定论。贝叶斯知识论跳出了有关确证的争论,是一种追寻既具简洁直观、精炼准确,又有着数学的美感、严谨的理论。主观概率是理解贝叶斯知识论的确证模型的切入点,也是该理论的预设前提。荷兰赌论证和条件化定理是贝叶斯知识论的两大基石。然而贝叶斯知识论自身也有其缺陷,不可避免地遭受来自各方的抨击。

关键词: 信念度, 贝叶斯定理, 主观概率, 荷兰赌论证, 条件化定理

Abstract: Since the emergence of Gettier problems, modern epistemologists have focused on the element of justification, which is controversial and inconclusive in terms of its structure and function. Departing from the debates on justification, Bayesian epistemology makes an attempt to formulate a theory that is concise, straight, precise and elegant. Subjective probability is a presupposition and an appropriate entry point of understanding Bayesian epistemology. Dutch Book Argument and conditionalization serve as the two cornerstones of Bayesian epistemology. However, Bayesian epistemology has its own shortcomings, which inevitably undergoes a lot of criticism.

Key words: degree of belief, Bayesian theory, subjective probability, Dutch Book Argument, conditionalization

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