Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science) ›› 2017, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (2): 133-139.DOI: 10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2017.02.004
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SONG Yu-chen， LI Lian-wei
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Abstract:
251 A-share listed companies which implemented the equity incentive plan during 2007 and 2013 were selected， and a comprehensive framework was set up by means of structural equation modeling(SEM) to analyze the direct and indirect effects of equity incentive on company performance， and to examine the pathway of equity incentive on the performance of listed companies. It was found that equity incentive can significantly improve company performance. 87.56% of the effect of equity incentive on company performance is realized through the direct acting pathway， and the rest 12.44% is realized through the indirect acting pathway. The pathway of agency cost accounts for 8.00% and the pathway of earnings management accounts for 4.44%， but the pathway of investment efficiency does not have a significant effect.
Key words: equity incentive, company performance, structural equation modeling(SEM)
CLC Number:
F234.4
SONG Yu-chen， LI Lian-wei. Acting Pathway of Equity Incentive on Company Performance ——An Empirical Study Based on Structural Equation Modeling[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2017, 19(2): 133-139.
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URL: http://xuebao.neu.edu.cn/social/EN/10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2017.02.004
http://xuebao.neu.edu.cn/social/EN/Y2017/V19/I2/133
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