东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2007, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (1): 133-136.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

委托代理结构中外部性问题研究

王丽娜;   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院 辽宁沈阳110004
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-27 修回日期:2013-06-27 出版日期:2007-01-15 发布日期:2013-06-24
  • 通讯作者: Wang, L.-N.
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    辽宁省教育厅高等学校科学技术研究项目(20040184)

Study on externality problem in principal-agent relational hierarchy

Wang, Li-Na (1)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-27 Revised:2013-06-27 Online:2007-01-15 Published:2013-06-24
  • Contact: Wang, L.-N.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
    -

RichHTML

0

PDF (PC)

581

摘要： 在外部性问题中,由管理当局、监督方和排污企业构成了委托人、第三方和代理人的三层委托代理结构.为了解决外部性控制中管理当局对排污企业监督的委托代理问题,运用合谋理论,建立了管理当局作为委托人在监督方诚信或不诚信情况下根据监督方提供的排污企业信息是否允许排污企业与监督方合谋以及相关成本的模型,并通过相关成本和模型的分析和论证得出了一个管理当局是否允许另两方合谋的最优范围,最后进行了仿真计算并得出了相应的结论.

关键词: 外部性, 合谋, 三层委托代理结构, 第三方

Abstract: A three-tier principal-agent relational hierarchy is built within the authority concerned, supervisor and the enterprise discharging pollutants, i.e. within principal, agent and the third party. To solve the problem of principal-agent relation in pollutant discharging under the supervision of authority during the control of externality, a model is developed. In it, authority as principal who judges that enterprise is allowed to or not to collude with supervisor in according to the information provided by supervisor for pollutant discharge whether supervisor is integrity or not with relevant cost also calculated. Thus, an optimal range is available to authority for whether collusion between supervisor and enterprise is allowed or not, and simulation computation shows correspondingly conclusion.

中图分类号: