关键词: 虚拟企业, 不对称信息, 逆向选择, 审核机制, 利益分配

Abstract: The selection of alliance members of a virtual enterprise is studied on project basis. Based on the principal-agent theory and the assumptions that the fixed cost, costing and retention utility have all come true in the alliance, an optimal examination mechanism is proposed via adverse selection. It reveals that the leader of the alliance has to design an examination mechanism according to enable every alliance member to participate actively in the alliance and work harder for it so as to implement the high-efficiency resource allocation, according to the correlativity of individual information actually offered by the alliance members who worked highly or lowly efficiently. The study is done with the intention of solving the project-based profit sharing problem in a virtual enterprise in accordance to how a member worked and what and how much information a member offered. Thus, it provides a theoretical base to a certain degree to solve the problem of alliance member selection in such virtual enterprises. The calculation results indicated that the optimal contract examination via adverse selection by the leader in accordance to the different information structures is in conformity with actual conditions.