东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2009, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 1346-1349.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

国有大型分公司总经理激励机制评价及实证分析——基于省级分公司的问卷调研

冯多;王世权;袁庆宏;   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院;南开大学公司治理研究中心;
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-22 修回日期:2013-06-22 出版日期:2009-09-15 发布日期:2013-06-22
  • 通讯作者: Wang, S.-Q.
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金新教师项目(20070145072);;

Evaluation and empirical study on incentive mechanism about general managers of large state-owned branch companies - Based on provincial branch companies' questionnaire investigation

Feng, Duo (1); Wang, Shi-Quan (1); Yuan, Qing-Hong (2)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China; (2) Research Center of Corporate Governance of Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
  • Received:2013-06-22 Revised:2013-06-22 Online:2009-09-15 Published:2013-06-22
  • Contact: Wang, S.-Q.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
    -

RichHTML

0

PDF (PC)

541

摘要： 从竞争性激励、控制权激励与薪酬激励三方面构建了国有大型分公司总经理激励机制的评价指标,并依据调研数据进行了评价及相关的实证分析.研究表明,国有大型分公司总经理激励机制水平整体较好,在各次级指数中,薪酬激励与竞争性激励要好于控制权激励,金融业整体上优于非金融业;控制权激励较竞争性激励与薪酬激励而言对分公司绩效贡献更大.在此之上,根据分析中发现的问题提出了强化激励机制建设的具体对策.并指出,由于大型分公司所表现出来的强"法人特性"以及总公司与分公司之间代理问题的存在,总公司在对待分公司的方式上,应由传统的管理向治理转变,但这又引致"分公司治理的必要性"等诸多理论难题.

关键词: 国有大型企业, 总公司, 分公司, 激励机制, 治理, 总经理

Abstract: The evaluation index of incentive mechanism is constructed for general managers of large state-owned branch companies from 3 perspectives: competitive motivation, controlling right motivation and salary motivation, then an evaluation is done in combination with an empirical analysis based on survey data. The results showed that the incentive mechanism of large state-owned branch companies runs well as a whole. But, for the secondary indices, the salary motivation and competition motivation are better than that of controlling right and, they are better in financial industry than in non-financial industries on the whole. However, among the three motivations, the controlling right contributes more to the branch performance than the other two motivations. Based on this, some specific measures are put forward to enhance the incentive mechanism according to the problems found by the empirical analysis. Besides, because of strong "legal person characteristics" manifested by a state-owned branch company and the existence of the agent problem between headquarter and its branches, the manners of headquarter treating its branches should transfer from traditional management to governance, but, which then arouse some theoretical issues, such as "does a branch necessitate the governance", etc.

中图分类号: