关键词: 通道费, 买方势力, 纵向关系, 产业链效率, 双重加价

Abstract: A model which connects lump sum slotting fee and industrial output was built to study the relationship between the retailer's buyer power and its slotting allowance behavior. The effects of slotting allowance behavior on the efficiency of the industrial chain were analyzed using Stackelberg game logic. The results showed that the retailer's slotting allowance behavior can improve the industrial chain efficiency. The retailer's profit and the total industrial chain profit will be enhanced with the increased retailer's buyer power. However, this will harm the manufacturer's profit. The retailer can choose a special form of slotting allowance to maximize the industrial chain efficiency to the vertical integration level. The distribution of profit between the manufacturer and the retailer will be exogenously decided by the retailer's buy power. Comparing with the Spengler's model, the retailer's slotting allowance behavior will benefit the total industry efficiency, the consumer surplus and the social welfare as a whole.