东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2010, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 621-624.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

多周期随机需求环境下基于寄售库存的供应链协调

李丹;唐加福;藏洁;   

  1. 东北大学流程工业综合自动化教育部重点实验室;
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-20 修回日期:2013-06-20 出版日期:2010-05-15 发布日期:2013-06-20
  • 通讯作者: -
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(70625001);;

Supply chain coordination based on consignment stock in multi-cycle stochastic demand

Li, Dan (1); Tang, Jia-Fu (1); Zang, Jie (1)   

  1. (1) Key Laboratory of Integrated Automation of Process Industry, Ministry of Education, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-20 Revised:2013-06-20 Online:2010-05-15 Published:2013-06-20
  • Contact: Li, D.
  • About author:-
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摘要： 面对连续的多周期随机性需求环境下的单一供应商与单一购买商组成的两级供应链,利用解析的方法,对由供应商主导的分散决策的供应链在寄售库存模式下的协调问题进行了研究.结果表明,寄售库存模式下,多周期随机需求环境下的供应商主导的两阶段的Stackelberg主从对策模型存在惟一均衡解.在分散决策下,供应商通过设计寄售契约参数批发价格,使购买商在最大化自身利润的同时,既使供应商实现最大化自身利润的目标,又使供应链实现最优化,即在寄售库存策略下,多周期随机性需求条件下的两级供应链可以完全协调.

关键词: 供应链协调, 寄售库存, 多周期需求, 随机需求, 分散决策

Abstract: For a two-echelon supply chain composed of just a single supplier and buyer with decentralized channels in multi-cycle stochastic demand, its coordination was investigated analytically, where the dominant party is the supplier who decided to sell goods on the basis of consignment stock. The results revealed that such a supply chain can be modeled as a Stackelberg leader-follower game to which there is a unique equilibrium solution, and that in the decentralized game the supplier can design his consignment contract parameter, i.e., the wholesale price, thus enabling the buyer to maximize his own profit and, meanwhile, it maximizes supplier's profit as well as the supply chain optimized. It means that the consignment stock can completely coordinate the two-echelon supply chain in multi-cycle stochastic demand.

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