东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2009, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (10): 1390-1393.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

随机需求下供需双方订货批量模型的博弈分析

魏静敏;唐加福;刘英英;金亚玲;   

  1. 东北大学信息科学与工程学院;沈阳理工大学应用技术学院信息工程系;
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-22 修回日期:2013-06-22 出版日期:2009-10-15 发布日期:2013-06-22
  • 通讯作者: Wei, J.-M.
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70515094)

Game analysis of ordering model for batch between buyer and supplier in stochastic demand

Wei, Jing-Min (1); Tang, Jia-Fu (1); Liu, Ying-Ying (2); Jin, Ya-Ling (2)   

  1. (1) School of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China; (2) Department of Information Engineering, Polytechnic School of Shenyang Ligong University, Fushun 113122, China
  • Received:2013-06-22 Revised:2013-06-22 Online:2009-10-15 Published:2013-06-22
  • Contact: Wei, J.-M.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
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摘要： 在随机市场需求下,首先分析了非合作无折扣博弈情况下的订货批量模型,然后在这种模型的基础上给出供需双方通过价格折扣政策的Stackelberg博弈模型.供应商给购买商购买的产品价格折扣以承担一部分库存风险,这使购买商增加订货量,从而增加双方的利润和供应链的利润.还分析了合作博弈模型及利益分配问题,并用数例比较了这几种博弈下供需双方的最优策略及相应利润.

关键词: 订货批量, 折扣, 非合作博弈, 合作博弈, 随机需求

Abstract: Analyzing the ordering model for batch in stochastic market demand without cooperation and discount game, a Stackelberg price-discount game model is developed between the buyer and supplier. With the product's price discount provided to buyer by the supplier who shall share partly the inventory venture, the batch quantity ordered by the buyer will increase so as to increase the profits of both parties and supply chain. Furthermore, the cooperation game model and profit sharing are analyzed, and a numerical example is given to compare the optimal policies and relevant profits between both parties on the basis of those game models proposed.

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