东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2009, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (3): 445-448.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于高科技公司治理角度的多重委托代理模型的构建

刘烨;李凯;金秀;高菲;   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院;
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-22 修回日期:2013-06-22 出版日期:2009-03-15 发布日期:2013-06-22
  • 通讯作者: Liu, Y.
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20080431147);;

Modeling principal-agent multirelation in the perspective of control of high-tech corporation

Liu, Ye (1); Li, Kai (1); Jin, Xiu (1); Gao, Fei (1)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-22 Revised:2013-06-22 Online:2009-03-15 Published:2013-06-22
  • Contact: Liu, Y.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
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摘要： 为解决企业委托代理关系中经理人的道德风险和逆向选择问题,企业所有者必须设立一套最优激励报酬机制来激励和约束经理人的行为,使其从自身的利益出发采取对企业最有利的行动.在传统公司股东、董事会、管理层委托代理目标函数的基础之上,构建了高科技公司的股东、董事会、管理层多重委托代理目标函数;并在传统公司管理层、雇员委托代理目标函数基础之上,构建了高科技公司的管理层、雇员多重委托代理目标函数.通过对比发现,高科技公司最优激励合同与传统公司最优激励合同的不同之处,源于高科技公司的治理特性.

关键词: 高科技公司, 委托, 代理, 公司治理, 信息不对称

Abstract: To solve the problem of the ethical risk and adverse selection brought by the management of a corporation that is systematically in a principal-agent relationship, the owners should set up an optimal incentive payment mechanism to stimulate and restrict the behavior of the management so as to enable them to do best for the interest of the whole corporation on the basis of their own benefits. An objective function is built for the principal-agent multirelation between stockholders, the board of directors and management of a high-tech corporation, based on those of a conventional corporation. In addition, the model of the principal-agent multirelation between management and low-level employees of a high-tech corporation is developed on the basis of a conventional corporation. According to the results of comparison, it was found that there is a difference between high-tech and conventional corporations in their optimal incentive contracts because of the sole characteristics in the control of a high-tech corporation.

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