东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2006, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (1): 1-4.DOI: -

• 论著 •    下一篇

激励Stackelberg策略下的电价算法

王庆利;王丹;井元伟;张嗣瀛;   

  1. 东北大学信息科学与工程学院;东北大学信息科学与工程学院;东北大学信息科学与工程学院;东北大学信息科学与工程学院 辽宁沈阳110004;辽宁沈阳110004;辽宁沈阳110004;辽宁沈阳110004
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-23 修回日期:2013-06-23 出版日期:2006-01-15 发布日期:2013-06-23
  • 通讯作者: Wang, Q.-L.
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(60274009);;

Power pricing algorithm based on incentive Stackelberg strategy

Wang, Qing-Li (1); Wang, Dan (1); Jing, Yuan-Wei (1); Zhang, Si-Ying (1)   

  1. (1) School of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-23 Revised:2013-06-23 Online:2006-01-15 Published:2013-06-23
  • Contact: Wang, Q.-L.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
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摘要： 讨论了电力市场中制定电价算法的问题.首先将对策论中的激励Stackelberg策略概念引入到简化了的电力市场系统模型中.从用户获取最大效用函数的角度出发,研究了适合于电力市场合理发展的动态电价的新方法.该算法较以往单一电价的制定更加合理,具有激励性质.根据电力公司的生产能力再结合当时当地用户对电力的需求,分别采用线性激励策略和非线性激励策略,制定更加合理有效的电价政策.利用MATLAB对所制定的两种激励策略进行了数值仿真,仿真结果说明所得方法的有效性和结果的实用性.

关键词: 电力市场, 分时电价, 激励Stackelberg策略, 电量控制

Abstract: Discusses the pricing problem on power market. The concept of incentive Stackelberg strategy was introduced into the model of a simplified power market system that comprises subsidiary systems of users and power system networks. The utility maximization of users is considered to determine dynamically the new power price on a rationally developing power market. The algorithm taking account of incentive strategy is more reasonable than that just splitting the bill as in the past. A linear strategy and two nonlinear strategies were proposed to the power pricing problem according to both the output capacity of Power Company and demand of users. Some numerical simulations were carried out for the linear strategy and two nonlinear strategies via MATLAB, thus illustrating the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed algorithm.

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