具身叙事:解开他心问题的希望之匙

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2022.05.001

东北大学学报（社会科学版） ›› 2022, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (5): 1-8.DOI: 10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2022.05.001

• 科技哲学研究 •

具身叙事:解开他心问题的希望之匙

何冠岐¹，郭露²

(1.华中师范大学马克思主义学院，湖北武汉430079;2.广西机电技师学院公共基础部，广西柳州545001)

修回日期:2021-08-20 接受日期:2021-08-20 发布日期:2022-10-03
通讯作者: 何冠岐
作者简介:何冠岐(1986-)，男(瑶族)，广西南宁人，华中师范大学博士研究生，主要从事外国哲学、认知科学研究;郭露(1991-)，女，广西柳州人，广西机电技师学院讲师，主要从事文学研究。
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学规划研究资助项目(20YJA72003)。

Embodied Narratives: Key of Hope to Solve the Problem of Other Minds

HE Guanqi¹， GUO Lu²

(1. School of Marxism， Central China Normal University， Wuhan 430079， China; 2. Department of Public Foundation Courses， Guangxi Technician College of Machinery & Electricity， Liuzhou 545001， China)

Revised:2021-08-20 Accepted:2021-08-20 Published:2022-10-03
Contact: -
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摘要/Abstract

摘要： 他心的存在问题和运作机制问题一直是心灵哲学的经典问题，当下解决他心问题的两个主要路径分别是具身模拟论和具身直通论。两者分别以神经科学和通过人类表征现象推理的角度阐释他心的运作机制。但是两个理论都有明显的缺陷，具身模拟论面临着镜像神经元建模以及神经元感知层次问题的科学挑战，具身直通论则无法对自身的“主体间性”理论缺陷进行自洽。能够把他心问题研究继续向前推进的理论是具身叙事理论。该理论是将托马斯洛的“叙事能力”和具身理论结合之后由梅纳里提出的一种解决他心问题的理论。具身叙事理论不但能够回避具身模拟论研究路径上的科学壁垒，还可以对具身直通论研究路径的理论缺陷进行弥补。

关键词: 他心问题; 具身模拟论; 具身直通论; 具身叙事

Abstract: The existence and operation mechanism of other minds have always been a classic problem in the philosophy of mind， and two main approaches to solve the problem of other minds are embodied simulation theory and embodied direct access theory， which explain the working mechanism of other minds from the perspectives of neuroscience and reasoning through human representational phenomena， respectively. However， both theories have obvious flaws. Embodied simulation theory faces the scientific challenges of mirror neuron modeling and neuron perceptual levels while embodied direct access theory cannot be self-consistent about the defects of “intersubjectivity” generation path theory. The theory that may move forward the study of other minds is the theory of embodied narratives， which is a theory to solve the problem of other minds and proposed by Menary， it is combining Tomasello's “narrative competency” and the embodied theories. The theory of embodied narratives can avoid the scientific barriers on the research path of embodied simulation theory， and also make up for the theoretical defects of the research path of embodied direct access theory.

Key words: problem of other minds; embodied simulation theory; embodied direct access theory; embodied narrative

中图分类号:

N031

何冠岐，郭露. 具身叙事:解开他心问题的希望之匙[J]. 东北大学学报（社会科学版）, 2022, 24(5): 1-8.

HE Guanqi， GUO Lu. Embodied Narratives: Key of Hope to Solve the Problem of Other Minds[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2022, 24(5): 1-8.

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具身叙事:解开他心问题的希望之匙

Embodied Narratives: Key of Hope to Solve the Problem of Other Minds

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