Abstract: Industrial poverty alleviation is a poverty alleviation model involving the joint participation of enterprises， poor households and governments. Therefore， in order to improve the allocation efficiency of poverty alleviation resources and achieve the goal of sustainable poverty reduction， the key is to require cooperation among enterprises， poor households and local governments to form a healthy ecological circulation system. Based on the evolutionary game theory， enterprises， poor households and local governments are integrated into an analysis framework as a whole of interest. By constructing the evolutionary game model of “enterprise-poor household-local government” in industrial poverty alleviation， this paper focuses on the analysis of the evolutionary game process of the multiple subjects' behavior choice in industrial poverty alleviation and the main factors affecting the behavior choice of multiple subjects in order to find the long-term evolution path to realize sustainable poverty reduction. It is found， on the one hand， that the behavior strategies of the three parties interact with each other. That is to say， the strategic choice of an enterprise is affected by its own factors and the choice of government strategy， and the strategic choice of poor households is mainly affected by their own factors as well as the strategic choice of the enterprises and the governments， but the choice of the government's strategy is not related to the choice of the strategy of the enterprise and the poor. It is only affected by its own factors. On the other hand， in the long-term evolutionary game， the three parties can achieve the ideal model of “active poverty alleviation by the enterprises， active participation of the poor households， and the government supervision” to achieve the sustainable poverty reduction.

Key words: industrial precision poverty alleviation, evolutionary game, sustainable poverty reduction