Abstract: Based on the evolutionary game theory， a model was built to explore the strategy selection of higher education institutions and banks in the risk management of national student loans. It was found that the higher the cost of student loans is， the more likely higher education institutions will take cooperative measures. The actual effect of default loan collection implemented by higher education institutions will be relatively poor in the condition that the starting threshold value of risk compensation mechanisms is bigger and the management responsibility of higher education institutions is comparatively small. Therefore， to reduce the default risk of national student loans， banks should be given permission to raise the interest of student loans， and each administering bank should offer sizable student loans. Meanwhile， the cost of student loan management should be increased among the institutions whose graduates have higher default rates， and the issuing banks of national student loans should be urged to take legal actions at those who have multi-period defaults in order to improve the default risk management of national student loans.

Key words: national student loan, default risk, evolutionary game