买方抗衡势力背景下的零售商最优服务决策

doi:10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2016.02.030

东北大学学报:自然科学版 ›› 2016, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (2): 295-299.DOI: 10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2016.02.030

买方抗衡势力背景下的零售商最优服务决策

李凯，李伟

(东北大学工商管理学院，辽宁沈阳110167)

收稿日期:2014-12-02 修回日期:2014-12-02 出版日期:2016-02-15 发布日期:2016-02-18
通讯作者: 李凯
作者简介:李凯(1957-)，男，辽宁昌图人，东北大学教授，博士生导师.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172150，71472032).

Retailers’ Optimal Service Decision Under the Background of Countervailing Power

LI Kai， LI Wei

School of Business Administration， Northeastern University， Shenyang 110167， China.

Received:2014-12-02 Revised:2014-12-02 Online:2016-02-15 Published:2016-02-18
Contact: LI Wei
About author:-
Supported by:
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摘要/Abstract

摘要： 鉴于已有的研究没有关注买方抗衡势力对零售商服务决策的影响，本文构建了纵向一体化、零售商无买方抗衡势力和连锁零售商具有买方抗衡势力三种情况下的服务决策模型，通过比较分析考察了连锁零售商买方抗衡势力变化对零售商最优服务决策以及市场总服务水平的影响.研究发现:随着连锁零售商买方抗衡势力的增强，连锁零售商的服务水平提高，当地零售商的服务水平先降低后提高；而且买方抗衡势力的出现一定会提高市场总服务水平，甚至会使市场总服务水平过高.最后通过算例验证了本文的结论，并分析了零售商服务水平对于市场需求基数和服务竞争程度的敏感性.

关键词: 买方抗衡势力, 服务决策, 连锁零售商, 当地零售商

Abstract: Given that the existing studies have not been concerned with the impact of countervailing power on retailers’ service decision， three optimal service decision models were constructed， including the model in which suppliers vertically integrate， the model in which retailers have no countervailing power and the model in which chain retailers have countervailing power. Moreover， the impacts of countervailing power on retailers’ optimal service decision and the overall service levels on the market were analyzed. It was found that chain retailers’ service levels increase with the rise of their countervailing power. However， local retailers’ service levels will first reduce and then rise with the increase of chain retailers’ countervailing power. Moreover， the overall service levels on the market will increase even excessively when chain retailers have countervailing power. Finally， an example was given to verify the conclusions of the current study and to analyze the sensitivity of service to the base of market demands and the degree of service competition.

Key words: countervailing power, service decision, chain retailer, local retailer

中图分类号:

F272

李凯，李伟. 买方抗衡势力背景下的零售商最优服务决策[J]. 东北大学学报:自然科学版, 2016, 37(2): 295-299.

LI Kai， LI Wei. Retailers’ Optimal Service Decision Under the Background of Countervailing Power[J]. Journal of Northeastern University Natural Science, 2016, 37(2): 295-299.

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买方抗衡势力背景下的零售商最优服务决策

Retailers’ Optimal Service Decision Under the Background of Countervailing Power

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