东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2012, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (1): 60-64.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

关于领导干部调任的演化博弈分析

张雪峰;范凯;李广洋;王浩;   

  1. 东北大学理学院;东北大学信息科学与工程学院;
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-19 修回日期:2013-06-19 发布日期:2013-01-17
  • 通讯作者: -
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(60774097)

Evolutionary game analysis based on the problem of cadres movement

Zhang, Xue-Feng (1); Fan, Kai (1); Li, Guang-Yang (1); Wang, Hao (2)   

  1. (1) School of Sciences, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China; (2) School of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China
  • Received:2013-06-19 Revised:2013-06-19 Published:2013-01-17
  • Contact: Zhang, X.-F.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
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摘要： 为改善领导班子的工作效率与单位风气,建立了新任领导和原有班子成员的决策博弈模型和收益矩阵,利用复制动态方程分析新任领导与原有班子成员选择不同工作方式的时间演化过程.不同策略的收益之间满足不同条件的情况下,根据系统雅可比矩阵的局部稳定性对可能的演化稳定状态进行了分析,通过分析发现,该系统的演化方向与博弈支付矩阵中的奖励和惩罚参数有关,为组织部门在干部管理科学化方面提供了一定理论参考.

关键词: 博弈论, 演化博弈, 领导干部调任, 复制动态方程, 演化稳定策略, 混合博弈

Abstract: In order to improve the efficiency of the leadership and bring up unit culture, a decision making model and a payoff matrix were established for the current leadership and the previous leadership. A replicator dynamic equation was used to analyze the evolution of previous work styles. According to local stability of Jacobi matrix, the possible stable states of evolution were analyzed under the circumstances that the different incomes of different strategies meet the distinct relationships. The analysis results show that the evolution direction in the system is related to the reward and penalty parameters in the payoff matrix. The proposed model provides a theoretical reference to enforce scientific management for organizational departments.

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