东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2010, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (7): 1043-1045.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

委托代理关系下团队激励机制的优化设计

王艳梅;赵希男;王高楠;   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院;清华大学机械工程学院;
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-20 修回日期:2013-06-20 出版日期:2010-07-15 发布日期:2013-06-20
  • 通讯作者: -
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    教育部博士点新教师基金资助项目(200801451043)

Optimal design of team incentive mechanism based on principal-agent theory

Wang, Yan-Mei (1); Zhao, Xi-Nan (1); Wang, Gao-Nan (2)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China; (2) School of Mechanical Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
  • Received:2013-06-20 Revised:2013-06-20 Online:2010-07-15 Published:2013-06-20
  • Contact: Wang, Y.-M.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
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摘要： 在委托代理的框架下,通过构建一个n人团队的委托代理模型研究团队激励机制的优化问题.通过对模型求解,得到影响团队成员激励的因素,并进一步分析了成员能力、风险态度以及团队化程度对员工相对激励强度的影响.研究结果表明,成员间的相对激励强度同时受成员能力、风险态度以及该团队的团队化程度共同决定;成员能力越强、风险规避度越小,该成员的相对激励强度就越大;另外,团队化程度较高时管理者应该弱化成员之间的激励差异.

关键词: 团队, 委托代理, 激励机制, 团队化程度, 相对激励强度

Abstract: Based on the principal-agent theory, a relevant model was developed for a team to study the optimization of team incentive mechanism, where the team included a principal and n agents. Solving the model to acquire the influencing factor on incentive to the members of the team, how the competence, attitude toward risks and team spirits of a team member, as the influencing factors, affect the incentive to him/her was discussed. The results showed that the relative incentive intensity or motive force among those members is decided jointly by the three factors as above. The higher the competence of a member, the lower the risk he/she will run and the stronger the motive force to push him/her. Moreover, the manager shall minimize the incentive gap between different members if the team spirit is high as a whole.

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