东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2013, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (7): 1057-1060.DOI: -

• 管理科学 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于灰色博弈论的私募股权投资基金监管研究

朱灿，史梁园   

  1. (东北大学工商管理学院，辽宁沈阳110819)
  • 收稿日期:2013-01-09 修回日期:2013-01-09 出版日期:2013-07-15 发布日期:2013-12-31
  • 通讯作者: 朱灿
  • 作者简介:朱灿(1970-)，男，山东济南人，东北大学博士研究生.
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271047).

Study on Private Equity Investment Fund Regulation Based on the Grey Game Theory

ZHU Can， SHI Liangyuan   

  1. School of Business Administration， Northeastern University， Shenyang 110819， China.
  • Received:2013-01-09 Revised:2013-01-09 Online:2013-07-15 Published:2013-12-31
  • Contact: SHI Liangyuan
  • About author:-
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摘要： 针对私募股权投资监管过程中参与主体的信息不对称和不透明，基于灰色博弈理论，研究了私募股权投资的参与主体在监管与被监管过程中的博弈行为.分析政府对私募股权投资基金监管过程中各方的预期收益情况，根据收益情况确定不同情况下的均衡点.结果表明，当政府监管时，如果私募股权投资主体违规操作的收益高于规范运作的收益时，投资主体仍存在违规操作的可能.因此应当设立专门的监管机构或法律对私募股权投资基金进行监管，加大违规操作的处罚力度，降低私募股权投资主体违规运作的可能.第三方自律机构在一定条件下也应该介入.

关键词: 私募股权投资, 政府监管, 灰色博弈理论, 收益, 均衡

Abstract: Targeting at the asymmetry and opaqueness of information， and based on the grey game theory， the game behaviors of private equity investment participants in the process of regulating and being regulated were studied. The parties’ expected revenue of the private equity investment fund with government regulation was discussed， and the equilibrium points in different situations were located according to the expected revenue. The results indicated that if the revenue of illegal operations is more than that of legal operations with government regulation， investors are likely to opt for illegal operations. Therefore， the government should set up special regulators or laws to regulate private equity investment and increase the punishment towards investors’ illegal operations so as to reduce the possibility of such acts. Besides， the thirdparty selfregulatory organizations should get involved under certain conditions.

Key words: private equity investment, government regulation, grey game theory, revenue, equilibrium

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