Journal of Northeastern University ›› 2009, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (3): 445-448.DOI: -

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Modeling principal-agent multirelation in the perspective of control of high-tech corporation

Liu, Ye (1); Li, Kai (1); Jin, Xiu (1); Gao, Fei (1)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-22 Revised:2013-06-22 Online:2009-03-15 Published:2013-06-22
  • Contact: Liu, Y.
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Abstract: To solve the problem of the ethical risk and adverse selection brought by the management of a corporation that is systematically in a principal-agent relationship, the owners should set up an optimal incentive payment mechanism to stimulate and restrict the behavior of the management so as to enable them to do best for the interest of the whole corporation on the basis of their own benefits. An objective function is built for the principal-agent multirelation between stockholders, the board of directors and management of a high-tech corporation, based on those of a conventional corporation. In addition, the model of the principal-agent multirelation between management and low-level employees of a high-tech corporation is developed on the basis of a conventional corporation. According to the results of comparison, it was found that there is a difference between high-tech and conventional corporations in their optimal incentive contracts because of the sole characteristics in the control of a high-tech corporation.

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