大股东数量的决定因素:治理效应权衡与股票流动性——基于中国A股公司的实证研究

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2017.05.004

东北大学学报（社会科学版） ›› 2017, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (5): 459-467.DOI: 10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2017.05.004

大股东数量的决定因素:治理效应权衡与股票流动性——基于中国A股公司的实证研究

吴世飞，刘淑莲

(东北财经大学会计学院，辽宁大连116025)

收稿日期:2016-11-29 修回日期:2016-11-29 出版日期:2017-09-25 发布日期:2017-09-20
通讯作者: 吴世飞
作者简介:吴世飞(1985-)，男，辽宁阜新人，东北财经大学博士研究生，主要从事公司金融与公司治理研究;刘淑莲(1954-)，女，辽宁大连人，东北财经大学教授，博士生导师，主要从事公司金融、风险管理研究。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金资助项目(12CZX019);辽宁省“百千万人才工程”培养经费资助项目(辽人社［2016］236号);辽宁省教育厅科研课题资助项目(WGD2016011);辽宁省经济社会发展立项课题资助项目(2016lslktzizx-04)。

Determinants of the Number of Blockholders: Tradeoff Between Governance Effects and Stock Liquidity——An Empirical Research Based on China's A-Share Corporations

WU Shi-fei， LIU Shu-lian

(School of Accounting， Dongbei University of Finance and Economics， Dalian 116025， China)

Received:2016-11-29 Revised:2016-11-29 Online:2017-09-25 Published:2017-09-20
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摘要/Abstract

摘要： 采用2010—2014年我国A股公司数据，运用有序Logit回归方法，探讨了公司大股东数量的决定因素。实证研究表明大股东数量取决于发声与交易两种机制下治理效应之间的权衡。这一结论具体表现为:在存在自然人大股东的公司中，大股东数量较少;管理者薪酬水平越高，大股东数量越多。从金融市场微观结构视角，证明了股票流动性的提高会增加大股东数量，且会优化市场对大股东、管理者效率的选择;此外，公司产权性质对大股东数量具有重要影响，国有公司中大股东数量较少。

关键词: 大股东数量, 发声机制, 交易机制, 治理效应, 股票流动性

Abstract: Based on China's A-share corporate data from 2010 to 2014， the determinants of the number of blockholders are investigated empirically with the ordered Logit model.The results indicate that the number of blockholders is an outcome of the tradeoff between the governance effects in voice and trading mechanisms implemented by blockholders. Specifically， the number is lower in the presence of individual blockholders and higher when managers' pay level increases.From the perspective of financial market microstructure， it is shown that the number of blockholders rises with stock liquidity. Furthermore， a higher level of stock liquidity strikes a more optimal balance between the productivity of blockholders and managers' effort. Besides， the number of blockholders is affected by the nature of corporate property rights， and the state-owned enterprises always have fewer blockholders.

Key words: number of blockholders, voice mechanism, trading mechanism, governance effect, stock liquidity

中图分类号:

F276.6

吴世飞，刘淑莲. 大股东数量的决定因素:治理效应权衡与股票流动性——基于中国A股公司的实证研究[J]. 东北大学学报（社会科学版）, 2017, 19(5): 459-467.

WU Shi-fei， LIU Shu-lian. Determinants of the Number of Blockholders: Tradeoff Between Governance Effects and Stock Liquidity——An Empirical Research Based on China's A-Share Corporations[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2017, 19(5): 459-467.

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大股东数量的决定因素:治理效应权衡与股票流动性——基于中国A股公司的实证研究

Determinants of the Number of Blockholders: Tradeoff Between Governance Effects and Stock Liquidity——An Empirical Research Based on China's A-Share Corporations

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