Does CEO Reputation Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? The Mediating Effect of Dual Agency Costs

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2023.06.003

Abstract

Abstract: CEO reputation can convey a good signal to the outside world， and the reputation mechanism can also play a promoting effect on corporate social responsibility in practice. It is found that CEOs with high reputation will promote enterprises to actively fulfill social responsibility. This conclusion still holds after robustness test and endogeneity treatment. Dual agency costs play a significant mediating role in the relationship between CEO reputation and corporate social responsibility. Reputation can motivate agents to reduce opportunistic behaviors and reduce the first type of agency costs so as to strengthen their attention to social responsibility. At the same time， reputation can reduce the collusion between agents and controlling shareholders， reduce the second type of agency costs， and make CEOs pay more attention to the needs of all stakeholders; as external pressure factors， the degree of analysts' concerns and the degree of market competition can strengthen the positive effect of CEO reputation on corporate social responsibility and realize the synergistic effect of internal and external governance factors.

Key words: CEO reputation; corporate social responsibility(CSR); dual agency cost; analysts' concern; market competition

CLC Number:

F276.6

XU Ning， ZHANG Yuan， ZHANG Di. Does CEO Reputation Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? The Mediating Effect of Dual Agency Costs[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2023, 25(6): 15-25.

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