An Empirical Test of Adverse Selection in Employee Maternity Insurance

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2023.03.011

Abstract

Abstract: Fertility behavior can be planned， so the risks covered by maternity insurance are essentially different from other social risks. Mandatory maternity insurance has lower coverage than other social insurances for employees， which has not yet been reasonably explained. The 2015 data of China Micro and Small Enterprise Survey was used to confirm that there is a positive “coverage-risk” relationship in employee maternity insurance. The proportion of female employees represents the probability of the occurrence of “fertility risk” in an enterprise. The study found that the higher the proportion of female employees in small and micro enterprises， the more inclined enterprises to adversely selection into maternity insurance， and the average age of employees negatively moderates the relationship between the proportion of female employees and whether enterprises participate in maternity insurance. The younger the average age of employees， the more serious the adverse selection. The insurance participation behavior of small and micro enterprises is affected by the abundance of local maternity insurance fund， and the more abundant the fund， the easier it is for small and micro enterprises to avoid participating in maternity insurance. To promote the coverage of maternity insurance， it is necessary to implement mandatory social insurance for employees， and focus on the adverse selection of small and micro enterprises in insurance participation.

Key words: maternity insurance; adversely selection; micro and small enterprise;female employee

CLC Number:

C979

YANG Panxu， ZHONG Renyao. An Empirical Test of Adverse Selection in Employee Maternity Insurance[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2023, 25(3): 95-105.

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