Managers' Excess Compensation and Enterprises' Dual Innovation

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2023.05.005

Abstract

Abstract: Taking Chinese A-share listed high-tech enterprises from 2011 to 2018 as the research object， the impact of managers' excess compensation on dual innovation is explored. It is found that excess compensation， as the embodiment of managers' power， has a significant negative impact on enterprises' exploratory innovation， but a significant positive impact on their exploitative innovation. When the degree of ownership concentration and equity balance increases， the inhibitory effect of excess compensation on exploratory innovation tends to be weakened， whereas the promoting effect on exploitative innovation is enhanced. Further research shows that managers' excess compensation will increase principal-agent costs， and when the financial flexibility is low， the stock price volatility is high and the degree of external marketization is high， the negative impact of excess compensation on exploratory innovation is weakened， and the positive impact on exploitative innovation is enhanced. Based on the perspective of managers' compensation， the factors that affect the development of enterprises' dual innovation are revealed， and the empirical evidence is provided for enterprises to reasonably formulate and supervise managers' compensation.

Key words: dual innovation; excess compensation; ownership concentration; equity balance

CLC Number:

F272.3

WU Shan， SHAO Jianbing. Managers' Excess Compensation and Enterprises' Dual Innovation[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2023, 25(5): 36-48.

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