Agent-causality，Agency and Rationality: A Kantian Response

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2024.03.003

Abstract

Abstract: Free action includes two elements—agency and rationality. There are two theories to explain free action， i.e.，reason-causalism and agent-causality. Compared with causality，agent-causality can illustrate agency better. The explanation of free action needs not only agency and rationality，but also the relationship between the two. However， neither of the two representative models of agent-causality can reconcile the two. Randolph Clarke's agent-causality would weaken agency，while Timothy O'Connor's agent-causality would meet the dilemma of reasons and cannot explain rationality. The common flaw of them is that they presuppose that the agent's active role and reasons are separate. A Kantian agent-causality claims that the basic reasons that explain rationally actions are rooted in the essential properties of the agent;therefore，when the agent exerts the active role，he is also providing the reason. In this way，Kantian agent-causality can effectively reconcile agency and rationality，thus explaining free action.

Key words: agent-causality; reason-causalism; agency; rationality; free action; Immanuel Kant

CLC Number:

N031

TIAN Changqi. Agent-causality，Agency and Rationality: A Kantian Response[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2024, 26(3): 16-23.

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