The Multiple Configurations and Corrective Paths of Ecological Governance Failure of Local Governments in China: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Fuzzy Sets Based on 15 Warning Cases

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2023.01.008

Abstract

Abstract: The analysis of various configurations of the failure of local government's eco-environmental governance is the basis for solving the failure problem. Based on the theory of objective management， an analysis framework， including the internal factors of responsibility implementation， policy implementation and process supervision， as well as the external factors of political and social coordination and media supervision， is established. With the help of the fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis method， 15 warning cases published by the Ministry of Ecological Environment are analyzed. It is found that the inadequate implementation of the main responsibility is the necessary condition for the failure of local governments' ecological environment governance. In order to deal with the three configurations that have failed， we need to establish a target responsibility mechanism， a lifelong responsibility investigation mechanism， a coupling mechanism between policy implementation and environmental protection ideas， a “principal-agent” mechanism for social organizations to participate in， a “double customer satisfaction” evaluation mechanism， a “media integration” supervision mechanism and other corrective paths. On the basis of strengthening the main responsibility， local governments should adopt different combination mechanisms to effectively govern the ecological environment according to different problem situations.

Key words: local government; environmental governance; multiple configuration; corrective path

CLC Number:

D035

YANG Xiaohu， WEI Shuyan. The Multiple Configurations and Corrective Paths of Ecological Governance Failure of Local Governments in China: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Fuzzy Sets Based on 15 Warning Cases[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2023, 25(1): 64-73.

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