董事网络位置对高管薪酬水平影响的实证研究

doi:10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2021.07.020

东北大学学报（自然科学版） ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (7): 1049-1056.DOI: 10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2021.07.020

董事网络位置对高管薪酬水平影响的实证研究

孙宸，庄新田

(东北大学工商管理学院，辽宁沈阳110169)

修回日期:2020-10-22 接受日期:2020-10-22 发布日期:2021-07-16
通讯作者: 孙宸
作者简介:孙宸(1993-)，女，辽宁沈阳人，东北大学博士研究生；庄新田(1956-)，男，吉林四平人，东北大学教授，博士生导师.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671030).

Empirical Study on Influence of Directors’ Network Position on Executive Compensation

SUN Chen， ZHUANG Xin-tian

School of Business Administration， Northeastern University， Shenyang 110169， China.

Revised:2020-10-22 Accepted:2020-10-22 Published:2021-07-16
Contact: SUN Chen
About author:-
Supported by:
-

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 利用社会网络分析方法，基于“董事交叉任职”所形成的董事网络，分析了董事网络位置对企业高管薪酬的影响，以及管理层权利的中介效应和产权性质的调节效应.研究发现，在控制了其他因素后，董事网络中心度以及结构洞指数越高，对高管薪酬水平的抑制作用越强；与非国有企业相比，国有企业董事网络位置与高管薪酬的负相关关系更弱；管理层权利在董事网络位置对高管薪酬的抑制中起到了中介作用.

关键词: 董事网络；高管薪酬；产权性质；管理层权力；公司治理

Abstract: The method of social network was used to analyze the influence of directors’ network position on executive compensation based on the directors’ network formed by the “director cross appointment”， and the mediating effect of management rights and the moderating effect of property rights.The results showed that after controlling the other factors， the higher the directors’ network centrality and structural hole index， the stronger the inhibition effect on executive compensation level. Compared with the non-state-owned enterprises， the negative correlation between directors’ network position and executive compensation is weaker in the state-owned enterprises. Management rights play an intermediary role in the inhibition of directors’ network position on executive compensation.

Key words: directors’ network; executive compensation; property right nature; management power; corporate governance

中图分类号:

F830.91

孙宸，庄新田. 董事网络位置对高管薪酬水平影响的实证研究[J]. 东北大学学报（自然科学版）, 2021, 42(7): 1049-1056.

SUN Chen， ZHUANG Xin-tian. Empirical Study on Influence of Directors’ Network Position on Executive Compensation[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science), 2021, 42(7): 1049-1056.

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董事网络位置对高管薪酬水平影响的实证研究

Empirical Study on Influence of Directors’ Network Position on Executive Compensation

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