Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science) ›› 2025, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (1): 145-152.DOI: 10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2025.20230211
• Management Science • Previous Articles
Yan-bo ZHANG, Ya-ning CHEN, Xiao-nan LIU
Received:
2023-07-19
Online:
2025-01-15
Published:
2025-03-25
CLC Number:
Yan-bo ZHANG, Ya-ning CHEN, Xiao-nan LIU. Influence of Environmental Protection Vertical Management Reform on Ecological Environmental Governance Ability: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on 238 Cities in China[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science), 2025, 46(1): 145-152.
一级指标 | 二级指标 | 指标说明 |
---|---|---|
污染治理绩效 | 工业废水排放 | 工业企业生产废水与污水总量 |
工业烟尘排放 | 工业企业排放的烟粉尘总量 | |
工业SO2排放 | 工业企业排放的二氧化硫总量 | |
生活污水处理 | 污水处理量/污水排放总量 | |
固体废物处理 | 综合利用量/固体废物总量 | |
生活垃圾处理 | 垃圾处理量/垃圾产生量 | |
环境法制建设 | 政府环境信息公开 | 污染源监管信息公开指数(PITI) |
企业环境信息公开 | 上市公司环境信息披露(EID)指数 | |
环境公众参与 | 承办的人大建议和政协提案数 | |
区域环境立法 | 环境立法数量 | |
环境质量改善 | 森林覆盖率 | 森林面积/土地总面积 |
绿化覆盖率 | 绿化面积/建成区总面积 | |
水土流失治理 | 水土流失治理面积 |
Table 1 Index system of the ecological environment governance ability
一级指标 | 二级指标 | 指标说明 |
---|---|---|
污染治理绩效 | 工业废水排放 | 工业企业生产废水与污水总量 |
工业烟尘排放 | 工业企业排放的烟粉尘总量 | |
工业SO2排放 | 工业企业排放的二氧化硫总量 | |
生活污水处理 | 污水处理量/污水排放总量 | |
固体废物处理 | 综合利用量/固体废物总量 | |
生活垃圾处理 | 垃圾处理量/垃圾产生量 | |
环境法制建设 | 政府环境信息公开 | 污染源监管信息公开指数(PITI) |
企业环境信息公开 | 上市公司环境信息披露(EID)指数 | |
环境公众参与 | 承办的人大建议和政协提案数 | |
区域环境立法 | 环境立法数量 | |
环境质量改善 | 森林覆盖率 | 森林面积/土地总面积 |
绿化覆盖率 | 绿化面积/建成区总面积 | |
水土流失治理 | 水土流失治理面积 |
变量 | LLC | ADF | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
统计量值 | P值 | 统计量值 | P值 | |
GOV | -12.464 5 | 0.000 0 | 17.940 6 | 0.000 0 |
FDI | -4.985 3 | 0.000 0 | 14.789 7 | 0.000 0 |
GDP | -2.125 9 | 0.016 8 | 5.038 0 | 0.000 0 |
INS | -11.561 7 | 0.000 0 | 15.826 0 | 0.000 0 |
FP | -14.637 0 | 0.000 0 | 22.029 9 | 0.000 0 |
EDU | -46.449 4 | 0.000 0 | 56.934 9 | 0.000 0 |
DENS | -6.011 1 | 0.000 0 | 4.845 2 | 0.000 0 |
ER | -3.379 6 | 0.000 4 | 11.031 5 | 0.000 0 |
ERM | -17.557 2 | 0.000 0 | 11.214 2 | 0.000 0 |
exp | -58.997 7 | 0.000 0 | 7.338 6 | 0.000 0 |
fiscal | -21.579 3 | 0.000 0 | 9.018 6 | 0.000 0 |
Table 2 Unit root test
变量 | LLC | ADF | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
统计量值 | P值 | 统计量值 | P值 | |
GOV | -12.464 5 | 0.000 0 | 17.940 6 | 0.000 0 |
FDI | -4.985 3 | 0.000 0 | 14.789 7 | 0.000 0 |
GDP | -2.125 9 | 0.016 8 | 5.038 0 | 0.000 0 |
INS | -11.561 7 | 0.000 0 | 15.826 0 | 0.000 0 |
FP | -14.637 0 | 0.000 0 | 22.029 9 | 0.000 0 |
EDU | -46.449 4 | 0.000 0 | 56.934 9 | 0.000 0 |
DENS | -6.011 1 | 0.000 0 | 4.845 2 | 0.000 0 |
ER | -3.379 6 | 0.000 4 | 11.031 5 | 0.000 0 |
ERM | -17.557 2 | 0.000 0 | 11.214 2 | 0.000 0 |
exp | -58.997 7 | 0.000 0 | 7.338 6 | 0.000 0 |
fiscal | -21.579 3 | 0.000 0 | 9.018 6 | 0.000 0 |
变量 | 系数 | t统计量 |
---|---|---|
EPVMR | 0.008 5** | 3.818 1 |
FDI | -0.005 6*** | -5.384 6 |
INS | -0.010 3** | -1.688 5 |
GDP | 0.008 1*** | 3.595 0 |
EDU | 0.017 7*** | 4.138 7 |
DENS | 0.002 0*** | 3.406 7 |
ER | -0.000 2*** | -8.398 9 |
FP | -0.037 5*** | -3.053 8 |
ERM | -0.000 3*** | -5.117 8 |
样本数 | 2 142 | |
R2 | 0.792 7 |
Table 3 Baseline regression results
变量 | 系数 | t统计量 |
---|---|---|
EPVMR | 0.008 5** | 3.818 1 |
FDI | -0.005 6*** | -5.384 6 |
INS | -0.010 3** | -1.688 5 |
GDP | 0.008 1*** | 3.595 0 |
EDU | 0.017 7*** | 4.138 7 |
DENS | 0.002 0*** | 3.406 7 |
ER | -0.000 2*** | -8.398 9 |
FP | -0.037 5*** | -3.053 8 |
ERM | -0.000 3*** | -5.117 8 |
样本数 | 2 142 | |
R2 | 0.792 7 |
t0+k | 系数 | t统计量 |
---|---|---|
t0-5 | -0.010 4 | -1.419 2 |
t0-4 | -0.008 7 | 1.120 9 |
t0-3 | 0.004 9 | 0.609 1 |
t0-2 | -0.055 6 | 7.137 8 |
t0 | 0.011 9*** | 1.292 0 |
t0+1 | 0.025 2*** | 2.768 6 |
t0+2 | 0.028 0*** | 3.079 8 |
样本数 | 2 142 | |
R2 | 0.782 6 |
Table 4 Results of the parallel trend test
t0+k | 系数 | t统计量 |
---|---|---|
t0-5 | -0.010 4 | -1.419 2 |
t0-4 | -0.008 7 | 1.120 9 |
t0-3 | 0.004 9 | 0.609 1 |
t0-2 | -0.055 6 | 7.137 8 |
t0 | 0.011 9*** | 1.292 0 |
t0+1 | 0.025 2*** | 2.768 6 |
t0+2 | 0.028 0*** | 3.079 8 |
样本数 | 2 142 | |
R2 | 0.782 6 |
变量 | 政策提前1年实施 | 政策提前2年实施 | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
系数 | t统计量 | 系数 | t统计量 | |
EPVMR | 0.005 0 | 0.830 9 | 0.006 9 | 1.249 5 |
FDI | -0.006 4 | -4.909 8 | -0.000 9 | -0.642 3 |
INS | 0.012 6 | 1.147 8 | 0.020 5* | 1.948 1 |
GDP | -0.000 3 | 0.117 0 | -0.000 2 | -0.077 9 |
EDU | 0.011 0 | 1.522 6 | 0.021 7*** | 3.219 8 |
DENS | 0.003 6 | 5.543 4 | 0.001 9*** | 2.896 3 |
ER | -0.000 2 | -9.276 5 | -0.000 1*** | -4.109 9 |
FP | 0.022 8 | 1.218 3 | 0.007 6 | 0.424 1 |
ERM | -0.000 3 | -4.637 5 | -0.000 1** | -2.290 0 |
样本数 | 1 904 | 1 666 | ||
R2 | 0.827 4 | 0.754 4 |
Table 5 Counter-fact test
变量 | 政策提前1年实施 | 政策提前2年实施 | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
系数 | t统计量 | 系数 | t统计量 | |
EPVMR | 0.005 0 | 0.830 9 | 0.006 9 | 1.249 5 |
FDI | -0.006 4 | -4.909 8 | -0.000 9 | -0.642 3 |
INS | 0.012 6 | 1.147 8 | 0.020 5* | 1.948 1 |
GDP | -0.000 3 | 0.117 0 | -0.000 2 | -0.077 9 |
EDU | 0.011 0 | 1.522 6 | 0.021 7*** | 3.219 8 |
DENS | 0.003 6 | 5.543 4 | 0.001 9*** | 2.896 3 |
ER | -0.000 2 | -9.276 5 | -0.000 1*** | -4.109 9 |
FP | 0.022 8 | 1.218 3 | 0.007 6 | 0.424 1 |
ERM | -0.000 3 | -4.637 5 | -0.000 1** | -2.290 0 |
样本数 | 1 904 | 1 666 | ||
R2 | 0.827 4 | 0.754 4 |
变量 | 模型1 | 模型2 | 模型3 | 模型4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
EPVMR | -0.065 7** (-2.264 5) | 0.007 3** (1.385 7) | 8.107 0*** (4.476 8) | 0.007 7*** (1.278 5) |
fiscal | — | -0.002 9** (-0.555 0) | — | — |
exp | — | — | — | 0.002 0*** (1.070 2) |
FDI | -0.008 2 (-1.508 9) | -0.005 7*** (-5.415 5) | 1.475 7*** (4.611 0) | -0.005 8*** (-5.471 3) |
INS | 0.000 3 (0.009 3) | -0.010 6*** (-1.712 0) | -6.406 6*** (-3.278 4) | -0.009 7 (-1.568 9) |
GDP | 0.033 3*** (2.661 8) | 0.008 1*** (3.616 0) | 5.090 4*** (7.113 2) | 0.007 5*** (3.277 0) |
EDU | 0.022 5 (0.643 5) | 0.017 7*** (4.162 7) | 13.691 6*** (9.134 2) | 0.016 6*** (3.785 0) |
DENS | 0.008 2*** (2.725 6) | 0.002 0*** (3.414 9) | -1.489 1*** (-8.585 0) | 0.002 1*** (3.498 8) |
ER | 0.000 5*** (5.647 1) | 0.000 2*** (8.430 2) | 0.005 9 (1.161 5) | 0.000 1*** (8.290 5) |
FP | -0.094 2 (-1.035 0) | -0.037 0*** (-3.007 0) | -2.181 8 (-0.537 5) | -0.037 1*** (-2.997 3) |
ERM | 0.000 2 (5.480 9) | 0.000 3*** (5.123 9) | 0.044 4** (2.298 1) | 0.000 3*** (5.003 0) |
样本数 | 2 142 | 2 142 | 2 142 | 2 142 |
R2 | 0.366 4 | 0.819 5 | 0.214 8 | 0.819 4 |
Table 6 Regression results of the mediating effect
变量 | 模型1 | 模型2 | 模型3 | 模型4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
EPVMR | -0.065 7** (-2.264 5) | 0.007 3** (1.385 7) | 8.107 0*** (4.476 8) | 0.007 7*** (1.278 5) |
fiscal | — | -0.002 9** (-0.555 0) | — | — |
exp | — | — | — | 0.002 0*** (1.070 2) |
FDI | -0.008 2 (-1.508 9) | -0.005 7*** (-5.415 5) | 1.475 7*** (4.611 0) | -0.005 8*** (-5.471 3) |
INS | 0.000 3 (0.009 3) | -0.010 6*** (-1.712 0) | -6.406 6*** (-3.278 4) | -0.009 7 (-1.568 9) |
GDP | 0.033 3*** (2.661 8) | 0.008 1*** (3.616 0) | 5.090 4*** (7.113 2) | 0.007 5*** (3.277 0) |
EDU | 0.022 5 (0.643 5) | 0.017 7*** (4.162 7) | 13.691 6*** (9.134 2) | 0.016 6*** (3.785 0) |
DENS | 0.008 2*** (2.725 6) | 0.002 0*** (3.414 9) | -1.489 1*** (-8.585 0) | 0.002 1*** (3.498 8) |
ER | 0.000 5*** (5.647 1) | 0.000 2*** (8.430 2) | 0.005 9 (1.161 5) | 0.000 1*** (8.290 5) |
FP | -0.094 2 (-1.035 0) | -0.037 0*** (-3.007 0) | -2.181 8 (-0.537 5) | -0.037 1*** (-2.997 3) |
ERM | 0.000 2 (5.480 9) | 0.000 3*** (5.123 9) | 0.044 4** (2.298 1) | 0.000 3*** (5.003 0) |
样本数 | 2 142 | 2 142 | 2 142 | 2 142 |
R2 | 0.366 4 | 0.819 5 | 0.214 8 | 0.819 4 |
变量 | 区域异质性 | 约束力异质性 | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
东部地区 | 中西部地区 | 省会城市 | 非省会城市 | |
EPVMR | 0.001 6* (0.249 9) | -0.063 0 (-1.859 0) | 0.007 4*** (4.369 1) | 0.000 8 (0.127 7) |
FDI | -0.014 1*** (-9.697 7) | 0.000 5 (0.275 8) | -0.004 1 (-1.090 3) | -0.005 8 (-5.404 2) |
INS | -0.006 9 (-0.900 9) | 0.015 6 (1.053 5) | 0.042 5 (1.502 6) | -0.014 6 (-2.334 2) |
GDP | -0.000 4 (-0.108 0) | -0.001 8 (-0.477 6) | 0.018 7* (1.673 2) | 0.003 0 (1.281 9) |
EDU | 0.031 0** (2.454 6) | 0.002 5 (0.249 8) | 0.017 5* (1.689 0) | 0.026 5 (5.958 3) |
DENS | 0.002 1*** (2.640 4) | 0.002 4 (2.198 8) | 0.005 3*** (2.967 8) | 0.002 5 (4.222 9) |
ER | -0.000 1*** (-5.114 1) | -0.000 9 (-7.504 7) | -0.000 1** (-2.344 2) | -0.000 2 (-12.174 4) |
FP | -0.031 6 (-1.135 6) | 0.037 3 (1.369 6) | 0.083 0** (2.041 9) | -0.049 7 (-4.111 0) |
ERM | -0.000 4*** (-4.699 4) | -0.000 4 (-3.357 9) | -0.000 3* (-1.903 3) | -0.000 3 (-3.750 3) |
样本数 | 1 062 | 1 080 | 252 | 1 890 |
R2 | 0.813 2 | 0.808 1 | 0.834 5 | 0.792 3 |
Table 7 Regional heterogeneity and constraint
变量 | 区域异质性 | 约束力异质性 | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
东部地区 | 中西部地区 | 省会城市 | 非省会城市 | |
EPVMR | 0.001 6* (0.249 9) | -0.063 0 (-1.859 0) | 0.007 4*** (4.369 1) | 0.000 8 (0.127 7) |
FDI | -0.014 1*** (-9.697 7) | 0.000 5 (0.275 8) | -0.004 1 (-1.090 3) | -0.005 8 (-5.404 2) |
INS | -0.006 9 (-0.900 9) | 0.015 6 (1.053 5) | 0.042 5 (1.502 6) | -0.014 6 (-2.334 2) |
GDP | -0.000 4 (-0.108 0) | -0.001 8 (-0.477 6) | 0.018 7* (1.673 2) | 0.003 0 (1.281 9) |
EDU | 0.031 0** (2.454 6) | 0.002 5 (0.249 8) | 0.017 5* (1.689 0) | 0.026 5 (5.958 3) |
DENS | 0.002 1*** (2.640 4) | 0.002 4 (2.198 8) | 0.005 3*** (2.967 8) | 0.002 5 (4.222 9) |
ER | -0.000 1*** (-5.114 1) | -0.000 9 (-7.504 7) | -0.000 1** (-2.344 2) | -0.000 2 (-12.174 4) |
FP | -0.031 6 (-1.135 6) | 0.037 3 (1.369 6) | 0.083 0** (2.041 9) | -0.049 7 (-4.111 0) |
ERM | -0.000 4*** (-4.699 4) | -0.000 4 (-3.357 9) | -0.000 3* (-1.903 3) | -0.000 3 (-3.750 3) |
样本数 | 1 062 | 1 080 | 252 | 1 890 |
R2 | 0.813 2 | 0.808 1 | 0.834 5 | 0.792 3 |
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