[1]Jiménez G,Saurina J.Collateral,type of lender and relationship banking as determinants of credit risk[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2004,28(9):2191-2212. [2]Caselli S,Corbetta G,Rossolini M.Where does the risk of default hide? Evidence from the Italian central guarantee fund [C]//AIDEA Conference.Lecce,2013. [3]Giuli M,Maggi M,Paris F.Deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2009,33(6):1058-1068. [4]Columba F,Gambacorta L,Mistrulli P E.Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance[J].Journal of Financial Stability,2010,6(1):45-54. [5]Busetta G,Zazzaro A.Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection[J].Journal of Financial Stability,2012,8(1):15-24. [6]Stiglitz J E,Hoff K,Stiglitz J E.Peer monitoring and credit markets[J].World Bank Economic Review,1990,4(3):351-366. [7]Ghatak M.Group lending,local information and peer selection[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60(1):27-50. [8]Laffont J J.Collusion and group lending with adverse selection[J].Journal of Development Economics,2003,70(2):329-348. [9]Chowdhury P R.Group-lending:sequential financing,lender monitoring and joint liability[J].Journal of Development Economics,2005,77(2):415-439. [10]Conning J.Monitoring by delegates or by peers? Joint liability loans under moral hazard[R].New York:Hunter College,2005. [11]Chowdhury P R.Group-lending with sequential financing,contingent renewal and social capital[J].Journal of Development Economics, 2007,84(1):487-506. [12]Chowdhury S,Chowdhury P R,Sengupta K.Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance[J].Journal of Development Economics,2014,111:167-180. [13]Sinn M.Sequential group lending:a mechanism to raise the repayment rate in microfinance[J].Economica,2013,80(318):326–344. [14]Guttman J.Moral hazard and repayment performance under group lending[R].New York:Indiana State University,2006.