Journal of Northeastern University Natural Science ›› 2018, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (3): 451-456.DOI: 10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2018.03.029

• Management Science • Previous Articles    

Mutual Guarantee: Joint Liability, Mutual Margin and Peer Effort

CHENG Chun-yu, ZHONG Tian-li   

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China.
  • Received:2016-09-28 Revised:2016-09-28 Online:2018-03-15 Published:2018-03-09
  • Contact: CHENG Chun-yu
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Abstract: A basic model was designed for the current mutual guarantee mode, which analyzed the effect of joint liability and mutual margin on the effort level of member enterprises. In order to encourage the efforts of member enterprises, it was proposed to strengthen the supervision and punishment mechanism and the sequential lending mechanism, and the effectiveness of these mechanisms was verified by establishing a dynamic incentive model. The results showed that under the existing mutual guarantee mechanism, the greater the joint liability and margin are, the lower the effort of the member enterprises will be. The supervision and punishment mechanism and the sequential lending mechanism can prevent member enterprises from taking low effort actions.

Key words: mutual guarantee, joint liability, mutual margin, peer effort, moral risk, sequential lending

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