Analysis of External Fairness of Compensation and the Consequences of Executives' Excessive Perks: On the Moderating Role of Internal Pay Gap

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2021.01.006

Abstract

Abstract: From the perspective of behavioral economics， this paper analyzes the causes of executives' excessive perks， and empirically tests the impact of external fairness of compensation on the consequences of executives' excessive perks as well as the moderating role of internal pay gap by using the data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2012-2017 as a sample. The study finds that the unfairness of external disadvantages of compensation will induce executives' excessive perks and weaken the “efficiency effect” of perks， while the internal pay gap can restrain such effects. In the case of the unfair external advantage of compensation， the unfairness degree has no significant effect on executives' excessive perks or the “efficiency effect” of perks. The internal pay gap will instead induce executives' excessive perks and weaken the “efficiency effect” of perks.

Key words: external fairness of compensation; internal pay gap; excessive perks; economic effect

CLC Number:

F271.5

MA Zhiying， SUN Shimin， ZHANG Hannan. Analysis of External Fairness of Compensation and the Consequences of Executives' Excessive Perks: On the Moderating Role of Internal Pay Gap[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2021, 23(1): 43-51.

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