Research on the Governance Effect of Financial Report Inquiry Letters on Performance Forecast Quality

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2023.03.003

Abstract

Abstract: Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and listed companies as two sides of the game， a static game model with incomplete information is constructed to reveal the governance effect of financial report inquiry letters on performance forecast quality through equilibrium analysis. With the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as the research sample， the empirical test draws the following three conclusions: the financial report inquiry letters improve the forward-looking and backsight performance forecast quality， indicating that financial report inquiry letters have a real governance effect on the dual performance forecast quality. The financial report inquiry letters of Shenzhen Stock Exchange have a more significant governance effect on the dual performance forecast quality. The governance effect of the financial report inquiry letters is still significant in the second year after letter receiving， but no longer exists in the third year after letter receiving， indicating that the governance effect of the financial report inquiry letters on performance forecast quality is transient.

Key words: financial report inquiry letter; performance forecast quality; forward-looking performance forecast; backsight performance forecast

CLC Number:

F271.5

SUN Shimin， GUAN Shuyu. Research on the Governance Effect of Financial Report Inquiry Letters on Performance Forecast Quality[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2023, 25(3): 16-27.

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