东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2007, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (6): 883-886.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

具有产品回收的闭环供应链协调模型

邱若臻;黄小原;   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院;东北大学工商管理学院 辽宁沈阳110004;辽宁沈阳110004
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-24 修回日期:2013-06-24 出版日期:2007-06-15 发布日期:2013-06-24
  • 通讯作者: Qiu, R.-Z.
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572088);;

Coordination model for closed-loop supply chain with product recycling

Qiu, Ruo-Zhen (1); Huang, Xiao-Yuan (1)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-24 Revised:2013-06-24 Online:2007-06-15 Published:2013-06-24
  • Contact: Qiu, R.-Z.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
    -

摘要: 研究了随机需求下具有产品回收的闭环供应链协调问题.综合考虑制造商和销售商同时负责产品回收两种渠道,建立了以制造商为主方,销售商为从方的闭环供应链Stackelberg主从对策模型;给出了分散决策下的Stackelberg均衡对策;分析了同集中决策之间的关系;探讨了闭环供应链渠道协调策略存在的可能性;最后结合家电废旧产品回收问题进行了仿真计算.研究表明,通过简单的“两部收费制”契约,可以在保证供应链成员利润基础上实现闭环供应链渠道协调.

关键词: 闭环供应链, 产品回收, 协调, Stackelberg对策, 契约

Abstract: The coordination of closed-loop supply chain with product recycling in stochastic demand is studied. Two recycling channels covering both manufactures and sellers are considered to develop a Stackelberg game model for closed-loop supply chain where the manufacturers and sellers play the roles of leader and follower, respectively. The Stackelberg equilibrium game is proposed on a basis of decentralized decision which is discussed in relation to centralized decision. The possibility of the existence of a coordinative strategy is also discussed for closed-loop supply chain. A simulation was therefore carried out for the recycling of household electrical appliances as junk. The result showed that a two-part tariff contract signed by both parties can simply make the closed-loop supply chain coordinative so as to ensure that both manufacturers and sellers in the supply chain gain their own rational profits.

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