东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2009, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 1358-1361.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

国际铁矿石市场主从联盟的博弈分析

侯卉;杨锡怀;韩超亚;赵彦丽;   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院;东北大学文法学院;
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-22 修回日期:2013-06-22 出版日期:2009-09-15 发布日期:2013-06-22
  • 通讯作者: Hou, H.
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    国家科技支撑计划项目(2006BAE03A04-1-1);;

Game analysis of leader-follower alliance on international iron ore market

Hou, Hui (1); Yang, Xi-Huai (1); Han, Chao-Ya (2); Zhao, Yan-Li (2)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China; (2) School of Humanities and Law, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-22 Revised:2013-06-22 Online:2009-09-15 Published:2013-06-22
  • Contact: Hou, H.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
    -

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摘要： 对国际铁矿石市场下的主从联盟从基于收入分享的角度进行研究,建立了主导方、从方以及联盟集成的利润模型,主从方之间的利润分配通过Stackelberg博弈进行分析.通过对收入分享比例、订货量、批发价格等相关参数的讨论,提出分散模式和集中模式两种情况下主导方和从方之间博弈协调策略.最后通过数值仿真,得到铁矿石市场联盟模式下的博弈结果,仿真结果也表明了集中模式下的联盟利润要比分散模式下的利润高.

关键词: 铁矿石市场, 主从联盟, 供应链, 博弈, 协调策略

Abstract: The leader-follower alliance on international iron ore market was studied from the revenue-sharing angle. The profit models of the leader, follower and alliance itself were developed, and the profit sharing between the leader and follower was analyzed through Stackelberg game. Discussing the revenue-sharing proportion, order quantity and wholesale price, the game coordination strategies between leader and follower were presented respectively in decentralized and centralized patterns. Numerical simulation showed the result of the game in alliance mode on the iron ore market and indicated that the profit of alliance in centralized pattern was higher than that in decentralized pattern, i.e., shared by the leader and follower respectively.

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