买方市场势力对下游企业产品质量创新激励的影响

doi:10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2019.08.024

东北大学学报:自然科学版 ›› 2019, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (8): 1197-1204.DOI: 10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2019.08.024

买方市场势力对下游企业产品质量创新激励的影响

郭晓玲¹，李凯¹，农蓓²

(1. 东北大学工商管理学院，辽宁沈阳110169; 2. 中国银联产品运营部，上海200080)

收稿日期:2018-06-26 修回日期:2018-06-26 出版日期:2019-08-15 发布日期:2019-09-04
通讯作者: 郭晓玲
作者简介:郭晓玲(1989-)，女，辽宁大连人，东北大学博士研究生；李凯(1957-)，男，辽宁昌图人，东北大学教授，博士生导师.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472032，71873026).

Impact of Buyers’ Market Power on Innovation Incentives of Product Quality in Downstream Enterprises

GUO Xiao-ling¹， LI Kai¹， NONG Bei²

1. School of Business Administration， Northeastern University， Shenyang 110169， China; 2. Product Operations Department， China UnionPay， Shanghai 200080， China.

Received:2018-06-26 Revised:2018-06-26 Online:2019-08-15 Published:2019-09-04
Contact: GUO Xiao-ling
About author:-
Supported by:
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摘要/Abstract

摘要： 构建了由垄断制造商和下游寡头竞争企业组成的纵向产品质量差异化模型，考察下游生产高质量产品的大规模企业在具有市场势力前后，各交易主体的质量创新激励问题和市场均衡结果的变化情况.研究表明，当下游不同质量水平的企业均无市场势力时，任何一方的产品质量提升均会激励其竞争对手的创新积极性;当下游大规模企业具有市场势力且与上游制造商进行合作谈判时，下游两家企业的批发价格和零售价格均随市场势力的增强而有所降低.与此同时，合作谈判交易模式前后，下游两家企业的批发价格、零售价格以及市场销量的变化情况均取决于买方市场势力的大小，而小规模企业的市场销量与利润收益始终保持不变.

关键词: 买方市场势力, Bertrand竞争, 质量创新, 创新激励, 合作谈判

Abstract: A vertical product quality differentiation model consisting of monopolistic manufacturers and downstream oligarchic competitors was constructed. Based on this model， the changes in quality-innovating incentives and market equilibrium results were investigated before and after the downstream large-scale enterprises with high-quality products had market power. Research showed that when downstream enterprises at different quality levels all have no market power， the quality promotion of any party will stimulate the innovation enthusiasm of its competitors. When a downstream large-scale enterprise has market power and negotiates with an upstream manufacturer， the wholesale prices and the retail prices of the two downstream enterprises will decline with the increase of market power. At the same time， the wholesale prices， retail prices and market sales of the two downstream companies all depend on buyers’ market power while the sales and profitability of small-scale enterprises remain unchanged.

Key words: buyers’ market power, Bertrand competition, quality innovation, innovation incentive, cooperation negotiation

中图分类号:

F062.9

郭晓玲，李凯，农蓓. 买方市场势力对下游企业产品质量创新激励的影响[J]. 东北大学学报:自然科学版, 2019, 40(8): 1197-1204.

GUO Xiao-ling， LI Kai， NONG Bei. Impact of Buyers’ Market Power on Innovation Incentives of Product Quality in Downstream Enterprises[J]. Journal of Northeastern University Natural Science, 2019, 40(8): 1197-1204.

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买方市场势力对下游企业产品质量创新激励的影响

Impact of Buyers’ Market Power on Innovation Incentives of Product Quality in Downstream Enterprises

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