东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2007, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (8): 1205-1208.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

非对称信息条件下供应链收入共享契约协调

邱若臻;黄小原;   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院;东北大学工商管理学院 辽宁沈阳110004;辽宁沈阳110004
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-24 修回日期:2013-06-24 出版日期:2007-08-15 发布日期:2013-06-24
  • 通讯作者: Qiu, R.-Z.
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572088);;

Coordinating supply chain with revenue-sharing contract under asymmetric information

Qiu, Ruo-Zhen (1); Huang, Xiao-Yuan (1)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-24 Revised:2013-06-24 Online:2007-08-15 Published:2013-06-24
  • Contact: Qiu, R.-Z.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
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摘要： 研究了非对称信息条件下供应链收入共享契约协调问题,建立了新的收入共享契约协调模型.在模型中,主方供应商具有批发价格和收入共享比例决策权,从方零售商具有隐匿边际成本信息和订货量决策权.探讨了零售商边际成本信息隐匿情况下的供应商最优收入共享策略,并将其同对称信息情况进行对比分析.最后进行了数值仿真.研究表明,为了设计一个激励零售商的最优收入共享策略,供应商将对零售商私有成本信息的不可观测性付出代价,导致利润降低,而零售商却可以从中获益.

关键词: 供应链, 收入共享, 契约, 协调, 非对称信息

Abstract: The problem how to coordinate the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract under asymmetric information is studied, with a new model developed relevantly. In this model, the supplier as the leader has the decision-making right for wholesale price and revenue-sharing proportion, while the retailer as the follower has just the right to conceal the information on marginal cost and determine the ordering quantity. Discusses the supplier's optimal revenue-sharing strategy in case the retailer conceals the marginal cost, with a comparative analysis made under symmetrical information at the same time. A numerical simulation is done and the result shows that the supplier's optimal revenue-sharing strategy to spur retailer will pay a price for the unobservability of retailer's private information and reduce his/her profit, while the retailer can gain from that.

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