Abstract: The operational decision-making of low-carbon supply chains with different market structures is studied under the conditions of monopoly and duopoly competition. Considering that the uncertainty about investment in emission reduction technology innovation will lead to disappointment aversion among manufacturers. The constructing corresponding game models are constructed in both cases， and the relevant decision-making issues such as the investment level in emission reduction technologies and pricing of the low-carbon supply chains are discussed. The results show that in a monopoly situation， the investment level in emission reduction technologies， and the manufacturer utility are all negatively related to the disappointment aversion coefficient， and positively related to the investment cost efficiency of emission reduction technologies. In a competitive situation， whether low-carbon manufacturers dominate or both parties have equal power， equilibrium results are negatively related to the disappointment aversion coefficient， and positively related to the unit travel cost of consumers， retail price of low-carbon products are higher when low-carbon manufacturers dominate than that when power is equal; the investment level in emission reduction technologies when low-carbon manufacturers are dominant is lower than that when the powers of the two parties are equal， and in all power structures， the expected profit and utility of low-carbon manufacturers are negatively related to the investment cost coefficient in emission reduction technologies， while ordinary manufacturers are on the contrary.

Key words: duopoly competition; low-carbon supply chain; effectiveness of emission reduction; disappointment aversion; power structure