Nonlinear Influence of Fiscal Decentralization on Local Government Debt Scales: Moderating Effect Based on Fiscal Transparency

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2023.03.004

Abstract

Abstract: Taking the reform of fiscal decentralization in China as the institutional background and combining the environmental factors of the fiscal system， the internal relationship and the working mechanism between fiscal decentralization， fiscal transparency and local government debt scales are deeply explored， and the panel data of 30 provinces in China from 2009 to 2017 is used to test the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt scales. The results show that the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt scales presents a significant inverted U-shaped relationship， that is， a lower level of fiscal decentralization will stimulate the rise of local government debt scales. As the level of fiscal decentralization expands， after reaching a certain critical value， fiscal decentralization will reduce the level of local government debts. Fiscal transparency is an important factor influencing the inflection point effect of fiscal decentralization and local government debt scales. The higher regional fiscal transparency is， the easier the inhibition effect of fiscal decentralization on local government debt scales is to squeeze out the stimulus effect， and the inflection point effect of fiscal decentralization may appear earlier. The impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt scales is heterogeneous in different regions and at different debt risk levels.

Key words: fiscal decentralization; local government debt; fiscal transparency; effect of inflection point

CLC Number:

F812

ZHAN Shaoguo， LI Xin. Nonlinear Influence of Fiscal Decentralization on Local Government Debt Scales: Moderating Effect Based on Fiscal Transparency[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2023, 25(3): 28-37.

References

[1]杨灿明，鲁元平. 我国地方债数据存在的问题、测算方法与政策建议［J］. 财政研究， 2015(3):50-57.
[2]毛捷，刘潘，吕冰洋. 地方公共债务增长的制度基础——兼顾财政和金融的视角［J］. 中国社会科学， 2019(9):45-67.
[3]陈宝东，邓晓兰. 财政分权、金融分权与地方政府债务增长［J］. 财政研究， 2017(5):38-53.
[4]黄春元，毛捷. 财政状况与地方债务规模——基于转移支付视角的新发现［J］. 财贸经济， 2015(6):18-31.
[5]Oates W E. Searching for Leviathan: an Empirical Study［J］. American Economic Review， 1985，75(4):748-757.
[6]王立勇，刘文革. 财政政策非线性效应及其解释——兼论巴罗-格罗斯曼宏观一般非均衡模型在中国的适用性［J］. 经济研究， 2009，44(7):65-78.
[7]方红生，张军. 中国财政政策非线性稳定效应: 理论和证据［J］. 管理世界， 2010(2):10-24.
[8]储德银，崔莉莉. 中国财政政策产出效应的非对称性研究［J］. 财贸经济， 2014(12):27-39.
[9]徐红，汪峰. 财政分权背景下的财政透明度建设与城投债扩张［J］. 经济科学， 2019(5):5-17.
[10]Tanzi V，Davoodi H R. Corruption， Growth， and Public Finances［J］. IMF Working Papers， 2000(182):1-27.
[11]Tiebout C M. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures［J］. Journal of Political Economy， 1956，64(5):416-424.
[12]尹恒，朱虹. 县级财政生产性支出偏向研究［J］. 中国社会科学， 2011(1):88-101.
[13]Baskaran T. On the Link Between Fiscal Decentralization and Public Debt in OECD Countries［J］. Public Choice， 2010，145(3/4):351-378.
[14]缪小林，伏润民，王婷. 地方财政分权对县域经济增长的影响及其传导机制研究——来自云南106个县域面板数据的证据［J］. 财经研究， 2014，40(9):4-15.
[15]孙萌，台航. 财政分权与经济增长: 理论分析与经验证据［J］. 经济评论， 2019(5):3-21.
[16]余应敏，杨野，陈文川. 财政分权、审计监督与地方政府债务风险——基于2008—2013年中国省级面板数据的实证检验［J］. 财政研究， 2018(7):53-65.
[17]张庆君，闵晓莹. 财政分权、地方政府债务与企业杠杆: 刺激还是抑制［J］. 财政研究， 2019(11):51-63.
[18]Freitag M，Vatter A. Decentralization and Fiscal Discipline in Sub-national Governments: Evidence from the Swiss Federal System［J］. Publius， 2008，38(2):272-294.
[19]Alt J E，Lasen D D. Fiscal Transparency， Political Parties， and Debt in OECD Countries［J］. European Economic Review， 2006，50(6):1403-1439.
[20]黄寿峰，郑国梁. 财政透明度对腐败的影响研究——来自中国的证据［J］. 财贸经济， 2015(3):30-42.
[21]Huong V，Rasha A，Owain A G. What Drives Differences of Opinion in Sovereign Ratings? the Roles of Information Disclosure and Political Risk［J］. International Journal of Finance & Economics， 2017，22(3):216-233.
[22]刘亮亮，贺俊，毕功兵. 财政分权对地方公共福利的影响——基于非线性和异质性的考量［J］. 系统工程理论与实践， 2018，38(9):2267-2276.
[23]Huang Y，Pagano M，Panizza U. Local Crowding Out in China［J］. EIEF Working Paper， 2017(7):1-84.
[24]张忆东，李彦霖. 地方债务清查及“排雷”风险——地方政府债务专题深度研究系列报告［R］. 福州: 兴业证券， 2013.
[25]陈硕，高琳. 央地关系: 财政分权度量及作用机制再评估［J］. 管理世界， 2012(6):43-59.
[26]Chen Y，Hu L. Optimal Government Investment and Public Debt in an Economic Growth Mode［J］. China Economic Review， 2017，45:257-278.
[27]汪冲. 政府间转移支付、预算软约束与地区外溢［J］. 财经研究， 2014，40(8):57-66.
[28]詹新宇，刘文彬. 中国式财政分权与地方经济增长目标管理——来自省、市政府工作报告的经验证据［J］. 管理世界， 2020，36(3):23-39.
[29]卢真，莫松奇. 财政透明度的提升能抑制“土地财政”的规模吗?［J］. 当代经济科学， 2020，42(1):25-36.
[30]Abiad A，Ostry J D. Primary Surpluses and Sustainable Debt Levels in Emerging Market Countries［J］. IMF Policy Discussion Paper， 2005(6):1-17.［31］Mendoza E G，Ostry J D. International Evidence on Fiscal Solvency: Is Fiscal Policy “Responsible”?［J］. Journal of Monetary Economics， 2008，55(6):1081-1093.［32］Bloom N，Floetotto M，Jaimovich N，et al. Really Uncertain Business Cycles［J］. Econometrica， 2018，86(3):1031-1065.