Abstract: GuanxiBao and RenqingBao in implementing rural subsistence allowances are viewed as rural governance tolls by most scholars after the tax reform. However， another sort of policy implementation variation is revealed through the case study of rural subsistence allowances in C Town， Shandong Province， where many village cadres tend to prompt the low-income families that if they want to receive subsistence allowances from the government they should return some subsidies to the cadres as an exchange reward. The inherent defect of subsistence allowances offers the possibility of such collusion. By establishing the patron system， village cadres can easily manipulate the low-income recipients. In turn， villagers can also game and choose a preferred delivery strategy for more profit. As a result the two sides may reach collusion. Finally， the current patron system and that in the collectivization period is compared， which indicates that the subsistence allowance publicity system helps to resolve the emergence of collusion.

Key words: rural subsistence allowance, policy implementation alienation, collusion behavior, patron system, game mechanism