Embodied Narratives: Key of Hope to Solve the Problem of Other Minds

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2022.05.001

Abstract

Abstract: The existence and operation mechanism of other minds have always been a classic problem in the philosophy of mind， and two main approaches to solve the problem of other minds are embodied simulation theory and embodied direct access theory， which explain the working mechanism of other minds from the perspectives of neuroscience and reasoning through human representational phenomena， respectively. However， both theories have obvious flaws. Embodied simulation theory faces the scientific challenges of mirror neuron modeling and neuron perceptual levels while embodied direct access theory cannot be self-consistent about the defects of “intersubjectivity” generation path theory. The theory that may move forward the study of other minds is the theory of embodied narratives， which is a theory to solve the problem of other minds and proposed by Menary， it is combining Tomasello's “narrative competency” and the embodied theories. The theory of embodied narratives can avoid the scientific barriers on the research path of embodied simulation theory， and also make up for the theoretical defects of the research path of embodied direct access theory.

Key words: problem of other minds; embodied simulation theory; embodied direct access theory; embodied narrative

CLC Number:

N031

HE Guanqi， GUO Lu. Embodied Narratives: Key of Hope to Solve the Problem of Other Minds[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2022, 24(5): 1-8.

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