Journal of Northeastern University Natural Science ›› 2019, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (12): 1685-1689.DOI: 10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2019.12.003

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Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Model and Mechanism Design Under the Consideration of the Risk Attitude

CHEN De-yan1,2, WANG Ding-wei1   

  1. 1. School of Information Science & Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China; 2. College of Science, Liaoning Shihua University, Fushun 113001, China.
  • Received:2018-12-07 Revised:2018-12-07 Online:2019-12-15 Published:2019-12-12
  • Contact: CHEN De-yan
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Abstract: To solve the difficulty of identifying score function and attribute weight, a winner decision model including the fuzzy input-output efficiency and supplier capability was proposed, as well as a two-stage auction mechanism. The effective bidding information could be extracted and the inferior sellers could be eliminated by the buyer in the first stage of the auction. In the second stage, the bidding value of attributes could be optimized and the final winner could be determined. The result of numerical example verified the validity of the model. The two-stage auction mechanism ensures the interests of buyer without the information disclosure. With the increase of buyers′ risk preference, the comprehensive efficiency score of sellers increases. Different risk attitudes will lead to the change of auction strategies of both parties and the difference of auction result.

Key words: multi-attribute reverse auction, risk attitude, winner decision; auction mechanism, comprehensive efficiency

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