Journal of Northeastern University:Natural Science ›› 2015, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (9): 1358-1362.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-3026.2015.09.030

• Management Science • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Wholesale Price Contract and Coordination Considering Fuzzy Demand and Inequity Aversion

WANG Ning-ning, WANG Xiao-huan, FAN Zhi-ping   

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China.
  • Received:2014-07-29 Revised:2014-07-29 Online:2015-09-15 Published:2015-09-14
  • Contact: WANG Xiao-huan
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Abstract: For the problem of wholesale price contract and coordination under fuzzy demand, a wholesale price contract model considering retailer′s inequity aversion was constructed based on the inequity aversion model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt. Then, the impacts of retailer′s inequity aversion on order quantity and supply chain profit were analyzed through model reasoning and numerical experiment. The results showed that retailer′s optimal order quantity and supply chain profit will decrease as retailer′s disadvantageous inequity aversion increases. Retailer′s order quantity and supplier′s profit will increase, and retailer′s profit as well as the total profit of whole supply chain will first increase and then decrease, as retailer′s advantageous inequity aversion increases. In addition, wholesale price contract can coordinate supply chain under certain conditions.

Key words: fuzzy demand, inequity aversion, wholesale price contract, order quantity, coordination

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