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Evaluation and empirical study on incentive mechanism about general managers of large state-owned branch companies - Based on provincial branch companies' questionnaire investigation
Feng, Duo (1); Wang, Shi-Quan (1); Yuan, Qing-Hong (2)
2009, 30 (9):
1346-1349.
DOI: -
The evaluation index of incentive mechanism is constructed for general managers of large state-owned branch companies from 3 perspectives: competitive motivation, controlling right motivation and salary motivation, then an evaluation is done in combination with an empirical analysis based on survey data. The results showed that the incentive mechanism of large state-owned branch companies runs well as a whole. But, for the secondary indices, the salary motivation and competition motivation are better than that of controlling right and, they are better in financial industry than in non-financial industries on the whole. However, among the three motivations, the controlling right contributes more to the branch performance than the other two motivations. Based on this, some specific measures are put forward to enhance the incentive mechanism according to the problems found by the empirical analysis. Besides, because of strong "legal person characteristics" manifested by a state-owned branch company and the existence of the agent problem between headquarter and its branches, the manners of headquarter treating its branches should transfer from traditional management to governance, but, which then arouse some theoretical issues, such as "does a branch necessitate the governance", etc.
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