Why Is the Local Governments' Rectification of Ecological and Environmental Problems Inefficient? Qualitative Analysis of Typical Cases Based on Centralized Notification of Central Environmental Protection Inspectors

doi:10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2023.05.008

Abstract

Abstract: As a supervision and guarantee mechanism for the construction of the national ecological civilization system， the central environmental protection inspectors play a significant role in optimizing the local governments' ecological environment governance mechanism and enhancing the efficiency of ecological environment governance. Using NVivo 12.0 to conduct a qualitative analysis on 64 typical case texts of the central environmental protection inspectors' centralized notification， it aims to understand the common problems of the local governments' ecological environment governance， and to refine the key factors affecting the local governments' rectification of ecological and environmental problems. It is found that four types of factors， including concept cognition， policy quality， management process and government responsibility， are embedded in the whole process of the local governments' rectification of ecological and environmental problems， and deeply affect the effectiveness of local ecological environment governance. The “concept-policy-management-responsibility” influencing factor model is helpful to explain the internal mechanism of the local governments' rectification behavior deviation. Accordingly， the local governments should explore the effective paths for ecological environment governance by reshaping environmental protection concepts， promoting diversified mechanism construction， standardizing management processes， and improving systematic responsibility systems.

Key words: local government; ecological governance; central environmental protection inspector

CLC Number:

D035

MENG Shifang， WEI Shuyan. Why Is the Local Governments' Rectification of Ecological and Environmental Problems Inefficient? Qualitative Analysis of Typical Cases Based on Centralized Notification of Central Environmental Protection Inspectors[J]. Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science), 2023, 25(5): 68-78.

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