东北大学学报（自然科学版）

东北大学学报(自然科学版) ›› 2008, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (1): 141-144.DOI: -

• 论著 • 上一篇    下一篇

非对称信息下供应链中商业信用激励契约研究

于丽萍;黄小原;李丽君;   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院;东北大学工商管理学院;东北大学工商管理学院 辽宁沈阳110004;辽宁沈阳110004;辽宁沈阳110004
  • 收稿日期:2013-06-22 修回日期:2013-06-22 出版日期:2008-01-15 发布日期:2013-06-22
  • 通讯作者: Yu, L.-P.
  • 作者简介:-
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572088)

On the incentive contract to keep trade credit with asymmetric information in supply chain

Yu, Li-Ping (1); Huang, Xiao-Yuan (1); Li, Li-Jun (1)   

  1. (1) School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China
  • Received:2013-06-22 Revised:2013-06-22 Online:2008-01-15 Published:2013-06-22
  • Contact: Yu, L.-P.
  • About author:-
  • Supported by:
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摘要： 利用委托代理分析框架研究供应链中制造商向零售商提供商业信用的激励作用.通过比较信息对称和非对称信息两种条件下信用激励契约的设计,分析了供应链中制造商与零售商之间的利益博弈,确定了使委托人期望效用最大的契约参数.指出零售商在非对称信息条件下付出的最优努力水平小于信息对称条件下的最优努力水平,随着零售商风险厌恶程度的增大,商业信用的激励作用会减弱.最后,给出了一个算例.

关键词: 供应链, 委托代理, 对称信息, 非对称信息, 商业信用激励

Abstract: In view of the principal-agent relation, the incentive effect of trade credit a manufacturer offers to his retailers in supply chain is studied. Comparing the design of incentive contracts with symmetric and with asymmetric information, the interest game between manufacturer and retailers is analyzed to determine the contract parameters so as to maximize the expected benefit of the principal by model optimization. The level of optimal effort made by a retailer with asymmetric information is proved lower than that with symmetric information. When information is asymmetric, the incentive value to trade credit decreases with retailers aversion to risk. A numerical example is given to illustrate the application of the proposed method.

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