Abstract: A coordinative contract based on a two-stage supply chain pricing model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer was studied. The model divided the entire sale period into two-sale periods and sells the product through a dual channel. There exists the Stackelberg game behavior which is dominated by the manufacturer among the supply chain members. The game theory was used to establish the decision-making model and an improved revenue-sharing contract was introduced to solve the channel conflict. The results showed that the e-channel can lead the retailer to raise the market price when manufacturer maintain traditional channels， which may adversely affect the overall market demands causing the decrease of overall profits. The channel conflict may ensue when the rate of recovery is lower under specific strategies. In order to solve the conflict of the mixed dual channel， an improved contract of wholesale price and revenue sharing contract was designed， which not only achieves the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain， but also helps the supply chain members to get Pareto improvement in their profits.

Key words: closed loop supply chain, two-sale periods, dual-channel, contract, stackelberg game