Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science) ›› 2016, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (2): 166-174.DOI: 10.15936/j.cnki.1008-3758.2016.02.009

• Politics and Public Management • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Institutional Basis and Behavioral Pattern of Chinas Composite Accountability

YAN Shuai   

  1. (School of Marxism, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China)
  • Received:2015-08-19 Revised:2015-08-19 Online:2016-03-25 Published:2016-03-30
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Abstract:

Contrary to the popular view that Chinas political accountability is accountability without election, this paper attempts to get rid of the election-oriented western thinking and look for a localized interpretation of Chinas political accountability. On this basis, composite accountability was proposed as a competitive concept. It includes both social accountability which functions to provide information mechanisms and administration accountability which functions to implement punishment mechanisms. In China, composite accountability has its institutional basis and behavior patterns, with the former reflecting the multiple principal-agent relationships based on the systems of administrative decentralization and personnel centralization and with the latter reflecting the accountability practices caused by the social resistance since 2003. It has become an effective approach for the Chinese government to resolve social conflicts, respond to social demands, provide public services and reconstruct political order.

Key words: accountability without election, composite accountability, institutional basis, behavior pattern

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